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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment presents two prominent legal theories for pro-
tecting the overall design and concept of a Web site user interface,
i.e. the "look and feel" of the interface. As explained by David
Bender, the "'look and feel' refers to the user interface, generally
manifested by the display screens that a computer program generates
and the keystroke combinations that are used for particular program
functions." 1 Protecting an individual element contained in a Web
site page, like a registered trademark or picture protected by copy-
right, is not this comment's main focus. Instead, this comment dis-
cusses how to legally protect the scheme, design, or total layout of
individual elements in a particular Web site user interface.
When a business hangs out its shingle on the Internet, the Web
site user interface is the shingle. A computer program that is com-
prised of sequential commands assists in the generation of the inter-
face that allows the user to interact with the program. With an esti-
mated thirty million users on the Internet, Web site user interfaces
are valuable as marketing and advertising tools for selling products
and promoting businesses on the Internet.2 This interface is the first
impression a consumer has contact with on the Internet, so its pres-
entation is vital for commercial selling purposes. Some designers of
computer programs even consider the user interface, which is the vis-
ual, external expression of their creativity, to be the most important
1. David Bender & Craig Nethercott, Lotus v. Borland: At the United States Supreme
Court, 430 PRAc. L. INST. 7, n.1 (1996).
2. PEOPLEBANK: Net Yourself a Job!, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 13, 1996; World Wide Web
Could Be Threat to On-Line Services, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Feb. 26, 1996, at 9.
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element of the program.' Thus, the entire Web site user interface is
valuable intellectual property and worthy of legal protection.
The two theories of law discussed in depth here are copyright
and trade dress. 4 Both present problems when applied to user inter-
faces which exist in an electronic environment. However, these es-
tablished areas of the law could feasibly protect a Web site owner
from copying or exploitation of the creativity in the site. This discus-
sion will present some of the most difficult problems in applying
both of these areas of intellectual property law to Web site user inter-
faces. Also, this comment proposes that in certain situations, trade
dress could be a more successful means for protecting a Web site's
visual design or look and feel. It is clear that trade dress protection is
not an absolute solution to the problem of protecting the total look
and feel of a Web site user interface from being copied or exploited
without permission. Trade dress may, however, afford greater pro-
tection than copyright law.
As a practical matter, this comment focuses on Web sites found
on the World Wide Web component of the Internet because it is the
portion most widely used by the public for selling goods and serv-
ices.5 The World Wide Web is now a commercial entity, not just a
means for obtaining or transferring information. 6 For instance, it is
difficult to watch television without seeing Web sites posted in com-
mercials so consumers can obtain further information about products
on the Internet.7 Thus, Web site user interfaces are a valuable adver-
tising tool and means for presenting products or services to potential
consumers in cyberspace.
3. Jack Russo & Jamie Naftiger, Software "Look and Feel" Protection in the 1990s, 15
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 571, 572 (1993).
4. Copyright protection prevents others from making unauthorized copies of the copy-
right holder's original work of authorship. Protection is codified in the federal Copyright Act.
17 U.S.C. § 101-1101 (1994). Trade dress protection prevents others from misleading the
public by using a trade dress as a source identifier that is confusingly similar to another trade
dress in the marketplace. Trade dress protection is codified in the federal Lanham Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1050-1127 (1994).
5. The World Wide Web network of computers, which is part of the Internet, is built on
hypertext technology. Robert Atkins, The Art World & I Go On Line, ART IN AMERICA, Dec.
1, 1995, at 58.
6. Greg R. Notess, The Internet Goes Commercial, DATABASE, Vol. 18, No. 6, Dec.
1995.
7. To illustrate, on October 7, 1997, between 8 PM and 9:30 PM on NBC-TV (through
local affiliate KRON in the Bay Area), I noticed eight World Wide Web site addresses in vari-
ous commercial television advertisements. (bayinsider.com, lazyboy.com, msnbc.com,
ford.com, playinggod.com, toyotacom, nbc.com, and farmersinsurance.com).
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Part I of this comment explores the basic problems with pro-
tecting the total look and feel of a Web site interface on the Internet,
regardless of the legal theory of protection applied. Part I11 addresses
the application of copyright law to the overall look and feel of com-
puter user interfaces, which provides insights on how to apply copy-
right law to the look and feel of Web site user interfaces. Part IV ex-
amines the basics of trademark law and the feasibility of utilizing a
trade dress theory to protect the total look and feel of a Web site user
interface. Part V deals with the broadening scope of trade dress pro-
tection, evidenced by recent case law, which indicates a possible
trend towards using a trade dress theory to protect Web site user in-
terfaces.
1. PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTING THE LOOK AND FEEL OF USER
INTERFACES ON THE INTERNET
The initial problem with legally protecting the overall creative
look and fell of a Web site user interface under copyright or trade
dress lies in the inherent, non-tangible nature of the Internet. First
and foremost, the Web site is an electronic communication. 8 This
communication is generated with the assistance of a computer pro-
gram that is structurally similar to software applications used to or-
ganize one's business or play video games, i.e. the software programs
involved make requests to the operating system of a computer so the
visual user interface will be displayed to the user.9 But on the Inter-
net, the end visual presentation a user sees on the computer screen
will be used to attract potential consumers to the Web site. Setting
up a Web site can provide many commercial benefits for a business.
For instance, among its many commercial benefits, a Web site can
identify one's business or products and be used as an advertising tool.
These benefits can help a business gain a competitive advantage in
the marketplace. Therefore, the user interface, which helps grab a
8. A central problem is that the Internet is not a physical entity and existing legal rules
or principles are based on physical borders that are tangible. Jonathan Freedland, The Writing
on the Toilet Wall, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 14, 1995, at 18.
9 On the Internet, a browser (software) interprets the instructions in an HTML file or
maybe a Java Script file and makes a request of the user's computer's operating system
(software) to display the visual user interface, based on the specific instructions the browser
received from the server of the Web site. The HTML file itself is not a computer program or
software, it is a file that has been marked up or formatted with tags that tell the Web browser
how to represent information to the user viewing the Web site interface. Java Script does con-
tain lines of computer code, so it can be more likened to a computer program or software.
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user's attention and helps the user easily navigate the site, is the most
important component of the Web site.
In addition, it is important to understand that Web site user in-
terfaces on the Internet are a different kind of electronic environment
than user interfaces in a video game or in application software be-
cause there is not a uniform regulatory entity controlling the Inter-
net.10 It is not like states that have boundaries, whereby interstate
commerce is regulated by the federal government according to one
unifying law of the land. The Internet is so vast and difficult to de-
fine that even if a central governing body existed, enforcing uniform
rules would be difficult. Most people using the Internet would likely
object to strict regulatory confines or rules." Many cyberspace par-
ticipants want to perpetuate a free flow of ideas and share informa-
tion even if it violates the intellectual property rights of another.12
Although it creates many problems and leaves other problems unre-
solved, state and federal courts must apply existing laws to this new
medium, as a means of controlling the Internet environment.
There are many other problems created by the Internet that af-
fect the legal protection of intellectual property contained in a Web
site. First, the marginal costs to distribute and copy information on
the Internet are less than costs to physically distribute the information
or purchase a copy. 3 The Internet is an international, interconnection
of computer networks that links millions of Internet users together
and permits them to access and share information at a low cost.
Copying shared information onto one's own Web site or download-
ing this shared information provides Internet users with free digital
copies of valuable intellectual property. Even worse, these copies are
of original quality and can be made with the click of a button.14 Sec-
ondly, the ease and accessibility of downloading such valuable intel-
lectual property from the Internet perpetuates a mindset in users that
taking without paying is acceptable behavior. Some users believe
that copying the layout of a competitor's site is not wrong, but
10. "Cyberspace, in its present condition, has a lot in common with the 19th Century
West. It is vast, unmapped, culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally terse, hard to get
around in, and up for grabs." John P. Barlow, Crime and Puzzlement: In Advance of the Law
on the Electronic Frontier, WHOLE EARTH REV., Sept. 22, 1990, at 44.
11. Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Wfhy Copy-
right Could be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 15 at 34.
12. ld.at34,36.
13. Id. at20.
14. Id.; See also Shawn N. Molodow & Eric Schlachter, Copy Control: Losing Track of
Information on the Internet, S.F. DAILY J., Dec. 26, 1996.
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merely a practical utilization of information readily available in cy-
berspace. What some call wrongful stealing, other Internet users
would call smart business tactics. For example, riding the coat tails
of a competing product's strength in the market by confusing the
public is a somewhat efficient business tactic, but a tactic not allowed
under trademark law. Thirdly, the boundaries of the Internet are dif-
ficult to ascertain. Consequently, traditional notions of jurisdiction
for courts are severely challenged because pinpointing where some-
thing is located in cyberspace is nearly impossible.15 Currently, ju-
risdiction, venue, and the choice of law for any particular case is un-
certain. Finally, the exact identity of Internet users is often difficult
to establish, so even pinpointing potential wrongdoers on the Internet
can be extremely difficult. 6
The need for look and feel protection will likely continue to ex-
pand in the near future and into the next century due to the consumer
market demand for more creative and complex interactive inter-
faces.' 7 Modem American society is bombarded with stimuli, espe-
cially visual stimuli. So, businesses will have to use very creative
means to catch and hold a consumer's attention on the Internet. Also,
commercial usage of the Internet is vital for any business or entre-
preneur who wants to successfully compete in today's markets be-
cause our American society is becoming more dependent on the In-
temet for communication and conducting business. Finally, as the
Internet becomes more commercialized, businesses will want assur-
ances that valuable intellectual property contained in Web sites will
be protected, thereby reducing the risks of doing business on the In-
temet.
However, the existing theory of legal protection best applicable
for protecting the valuable intellectual property found in the look and
feel of Web site user interfaces may be difficult to ascertain. It is al-
ready apparent that applying existing laws to the Internet will present
a challenge to lawyers and courts. So, applying copyright or trade-
mark law to Web site user interfaces may seem like trying to fit the
proverbial square peg into a round hole due to the nature of the Inter-
15. "The immense reach of the Internet clearly has the potential to eviscerate or circum-
vent any traditional jurisdictional limitations." Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, On-Line
LegalIssues, N.Y..., Feb. 15, 1995, at 30.
16. Id. at 20.
17. Russo & Nafriger, supra note 3, at 572.
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net environment.18 However, it is a necessary consequence of the
growth and commercialization of the Internet.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF WEB SITE USER INTERFACES
A. General Theory of Copyright Protection
Copyright law is like other areas of intellectual property law in
that it strives to stimulate creativity and innovation by granting prop-
erty rights as an incentive, while at the same time perpetuating public
interests. Copyright protection recognizes a property right in an
author's creative works, but also furthers the public's free access to
information by limiting the scope of what subject matter is protected
by copyright. 19 Similarly, patent protection stimulates new and use-
ful inventions by granting inventors a monopoly for a limited time so
the public can benefit from more efficient processes, machines,
manufactures and compositions of matter.20 Another example is
trademark law, which protects the good will in creative, distinctive
source identifiers, while protecting the public from confusion about
the quality and integrity of goods and services they purchase.2' How-
ever, with copyright law, it is difficult to balance the interest in
keeping public access to information open against the interest in
protecting an author's property rights in his creations32 The protec-
18. Courts have already expressly stated that applying copyright law to computer pro-
grams is like trying to fit the "proverbial square peg into a round hole," since programs are
utilitarian by nature. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (7th Cir.
1992). This frustration will likely be felt when applying copyright law and even trademark law
to the look and feel of Web site user interfaces on the Internet. See also John Perry Barlow,
Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, WIRED, Mar. 1994 at
85.
19 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 107 (1994).
20. The struggle to strike a balance between protection and the public's benefit can be
seen expressly in the United States Constitution. The Constitution's Patent Clause granted
Congress the power to protect inventions, via patent monopolies, but with the limitation that
protection could only be afforded to inventions that "promote the progress of science and the
useful arts ....." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cI. 8. The importance of only protecting inventions
that also perpetuate public benefit is reflected in the Patent Act which limits patentable subject
matter to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ..
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
21. The concern for protecting the public from being confused about the source of differ-
ent products in the marketplace can be seen directly in the federal statute that governs the pro-
tection of trademarks, the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994). This protection allows a
consumer to make an informed buying decision, so the public is benefited from the protection.
22. The United States Constitution limits copyright protection to those works that
"promote the progress of science and useful arts," which limits what content is taken from the
public domain." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Act also distinguishes the type
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tion of intellectual property and public interests are at odds, so de-
termining a balance under the law is often a challenge.
The United States Constitution expressly gives Congress the
power to grant authors exclusive rights in their "writings," and the
scope of protectable writings has been broadly interpreted23 But, the
Copyright Act of 197624 extends copyright protection to an author's
original "works of authorship," not to all of an author's writings.2
This new language seems to narrow the scope of copyright protec-
tion, indicating that Congress did not intend copyright protection to
extend to all types of works eligible for copyright protection under
the Constitution. Again, the public's interest in free access to infor-
mation resonates in this limitation. Ultimately, copyright protection
is not the end all, be all for protecting all creative works in our soci-
ety.
Furthermore, it is important to understand that copyright law
only protects the expression of the idea from being copied without
permission, not the idea itself.26 Anyone can freely express an idea or
concept in a different manner, even if the idea is identical to another
author's idea. For example, the creative choice of colors and textures
used to create a painting of a forest is protectable intellectual prop-
erty under copyright law, but the idea being expressed, the forest, is
not individually protectable. Only expressions are protected because
the policy of promoting a competitive marketplace lies in the back-
ground of copyright protection. In copyright law this
"idea/expression dichotomy, ' 27 as it is often called, again reveals the
tension between the public's free access to information and the pro-
tection of intellectual property. It would be unfair and stifle creativ-
ity to grant an author the right to exclude others from painting a for-
est in a different way. Copyright law only protects an author's
original expression from acts of copying or paraphrasing; it does not
of content that is protected and that which should remain accessible by the public. 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
23. "The Congress shall have Power To... promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994) ("Copyright Act").
25. "Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship..." 17
U.S.C. § 102(a).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1994); See also, HOWARD C. ANAWALT AND ELIZABET F.
ENAYATI, IP STRATEGY: COMPLETE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLANNING, AccEss AND
PROTECTION § 1.03[1], [9] (1997).
27. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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prohibit another from independently producing similar expression of
an idea.28
B. Copyright Protection of an Electronic Environment
The Internet, like a painting canvas, is merely another medium
by which an author can express an idea or convey information. But,
the electronic nature of the Internet creates special problems in ap-
plying existing copyright law. We are not dealing with a tangible lit-
erary work, such as a book or painting, that can be analyzed more
readily under the law. A Web site user interface on the Internet can
be more likened to a computer program's visual user interface. Since
there is not a medium of expression that exactly fits the characteris-
tics of a Web site user interface, we must look at the closest rela-
tive - computer program user interfaces.
A computer program consists of a written work in the code, a
functional work in the tasks executed by the software, and a visual
work in the user interfaces. 29 It is generally settled that most ele-
ments in a computer program are eligible for copyright protection.30
Further, as a result of recommendations to Congress from The Com-
mission on New Technological Uses for Copyrightable Works
("CONTU") in 1978,1 Congress added a definition of "computer
program" to § 101 of the Copyright Act 2 and added § 117 to the Act
which specifies certain kinds of permitted copying of computer pro-
grams. 33 Thus, a written computer program is considered a literary
work under § 102(a)(1) of the Copyright Act and protected by copy-
right.34
However, the visual user interface of a computer program could
lack originality or contain purely functional aspects that are individu-
28. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,348 (1991).
29. Joseph & Vogel, supra note 59, at 381.
30. Id.at381-382.
31. CONTU was created to look at computer uses of copyrighted works and to offer rec-
ommendations on how to apply copyright law to computer programs. This group consisted of
experts who could advise Congress on how to deal with the perplexing problem of fitting com-
puter programs into the existing copyright protections provided under the Copyright Act.
32. "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a result.". 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
33. "It is not an infringement for an owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program ... " 17
U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
34. Joseph and Vogel supra note 59, at 381. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714, F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d. Cir. 1983).
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ally not protectable by copyright. The graphical user interface as a
whole, which includes the visual screen display and command hierar-
chy, could be considered just a method for operating the computer.
Unfortunately, the Copyright Act expressly states that methods of
operation are totally excluded from copyright protection 5 Congress
and courts have struggled to stabilize the meaning of copyright pro-
tection when dealing with aspects of computer programs beyond the
literal code, like user interfaces 6 Copyright protection of elements
beyond the actual computer code creates a great struggle to draw the
line between an expression that is afforded copyright protection and
the idea, itself, that is not afforded protection. Courts have especially
had difficulty deciding what components beyond the literal computer
code are just functional elements which should not be extended copy-
right protection.
Copyright protection extends to the source and object code of
computer programs used to generate graphical user interfaces. 37 In
addition, some non-literal elements in a computer program, (i.e. non
code elements) which manifest the underlying structure and organi-
zation of the program, are eligible for protection under copyright
law.38 Thus, the user interface, which is generated by a computer
program, that a consumer views when they visit a Web site could also
be considered a creative, original expression that is eligible for copy-
right protection, The problem is deciphering the scope of copyright
protection for these non-code elements in a computer program or
Web site, in light of the limits on and exceptions to an author's prop-
erty rights to copy and distribute his original work of authorship. 39
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, prin-
ciple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work").
36., Joseph & Vogel, supra note 59, at 382.
37. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d. Cir. 1983). The
computer code contains the instructions used for operating the computer. There are three lev-
els of computer language used for writing these "instructions." "High level language ... uses
English words and symbols" and is readable by human eyes. "A somewhat lower level lan-
guage is assembly language, which consists of alphanumeric labels." These two levels of code
language are considered the "source code." The "lowest level computer language is machine
language, a binary language using two symbols, 0 and 1 .... This low level language which
is only readable by the computer is referred to as object code. Id. at 1243.
38. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d. Cir. 1986); Com-
puter Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107 (1994). Section 102(b) lists subject matter that is not pro-
tectable under copyright, including subject matter that is protected by patent law. Section 107
provides affirmative defenses to copyright infringement.
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These limits and exceptions create difficulties in gaining copyright
protection of all look and feel aspects of user interfaces on the Inter-
net as discussed in the next section of this comment, III C.
C. Basic Requirements for Copyrightable Subject Matter
In order for any expression contained in a computer program
user interface or Web site user interface to even be considered copy-
rightable subject matter, the § 102(a)40 requirements of "originality"
and "fixation in a tangible medium of expression" must be met. Ac-
cording to the statute, copyright protection can be found "in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated."' 41 The language, "now known
or later developed," shows that new technologies and mediums were
anticipated by the statute and could be considered tangible mediums
for fixation purposes.42
Courts have previously held that information embedded in com-
puter Read Only Memory ("ROM") constitutes "fixation in a tangi-
ble medium. ' 43 Likewise, another more permanent storage medium
is the hard drive or hard disk of a computer; permanent in the sense
the information stored remains stored beyond power turn off. Files
stored on the hard drive can be erased by the user. However, the in-
formation is essentially fixed, like with information in the ROM,
such that data on the hard drive can be retrieved again once the com-
puter is turned off. Web site page files, which contain the instruc-
tions for generating the user interface that a user sees on each linked
page of a Web site, are saved on a computer's hard drive. Thus, the
displayed Web site user interfaces would likely satisfy the fixation
requirement because the instructions for the layout that will be dis-
played are fixed in the file on the hard drive. But, proving the second
element, originality, could be difficult when dealing with the look
and feel of computer programs and, similarly, Web sites on the Inter-
net. This would be particularly true with Web Sites that are straight-
forward or just simplistic presentations of information. Courts have
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
42 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
43. "The ROM (Read Only Memory) is an internal permanent memory device consisting
of a semi-conductor "chip" which is incorporated into the circuitry of the computer. A pro-
gram in object code is embedded on a ROM before it is incorporated in the computer." Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240; 1243 (3d Cir. 1983).
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not yet thoroughly addressed this issue, but insight is found in exist-
ing case law which discusses the requirements for finding originality
under copyright law.
1. Originality
To find that a work is original, there must be some independent
creation by the author, and some minimal degree of creativity. 4 In
the seminal case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., Inc.,45 the Supreme Court provided guidelines for determining
whether works are original. In Feist, the selection and arrangement
of telephone white page listings were not sufficiently creative to sat-
isfy the originality requirement for copyright protection.46 The Court
noted that originality is required by the U.S. Constitution47 as well as
by § 102(a)48 of the Copyright Act.49 The Court also acknowledged
that the level of creativity required is low, and that "even a slight
amount will suffice. ' 50 This case is important because even with this
low standard, the choices used in the layout and arrangement of
phone book information did not possess the requisite level of creativ-
ity to qualify for copyright protection. Likewise, a simple Web site
user interface that just arranges common information may not be
protected by copyright according to the reasoning in Feist. Unfortu-
nately, after the case, we know what is not enough creativity, but de-
ciding what is enough creativity can be more difficult.
The Court also rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine used
by lower courts to justify a finding of originality.5' This means that
putting time and effort into a work does not necessarily make the
work original. So, a Web site owner can't claim copyright protection
just because effort was put forth to create the site. Moreover, origi-
nality does not necessarily mean "novel," so there can be similarities
between works that are both considered original, so long as there is
not actual copying.5 2
44. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A]
(1996).
45. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
46. Id. at 361.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
49. Id. at 346.
50. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991).
51. Id. at 353.
52. Id. at 345.
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The visual user interface component of a computer program or a
Web site will likely be considered original if there are some graphics
or a creative, visual presentation. Although the level of creativity re-
quired is low, it may be difficult to find the originality required for
copyright protection in simplistic Web sites that just arrange facts or
information.-3 It is likely that many Web sites will be simplistic be-
cause many entrepreneurs and small businesses do not have the re-
sources to create an elaborate site. The Web site may lack highly
creative, visual graphics and, instead, contain mostly functional ele-
ments used for navigating through the information on the site. Also,
under the Copyright Office's regulation prohibiting copyright pro-
tection in blank forms, a simple screen display that simply asks for
customer information and does not itself convey information would
not likely receive copyright protection anyway.54 Furthermore, many
structures for creating a Web site user interface are basic and offer
limited variations for creating the Web site. If there are only a few
alternatives available for creating the design of a Web site, such that
the idea merges with the expression, copyright protection will not be
extended to that expression.55 Thus, potentially only elaborate and
somewhat creative Web site interfaces will satisfy the originality re-
quirement for copyright protection.
2. Subject Matter Excluded from Copyright Protection
While originality and fixation in a tangible medium of expres-
sion are preliminary hurdles for determining what subject matter can
obtain copyright protection, the main problem for protecting com-
puter user interfaces is the limitation in § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act.56 Copyright protection extends to expression,57 and not to the
"idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery... ., It is logical to argue that "the 'look
53. Id.at 361.
54. "Material not subject to copyright ... Blank forms, such as time cards... report
forms, order forms ... which are designed for recording information and do not in themselves
convey information." Copyright Office Regulation, 37 C.F.R. 202.1(c) (1997).
55. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(explains merger doctrine).
56. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
57. Bakery. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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and feel' of a program is nothing more than a combination of all the
controls and procedures that a user has at their disposal to control the
computer. ' 59 While highly creative expressions of this procedure in
a user screen display may give rise to copyright protection, current
case law seems to leave screen displays of a Web site with potentially
limited protection. In turn, this leaves the look and feel of a site's
user interface, which includes the screen display, with limited pro-
tection.
D. Substantial Similarity
It is important to consider the standard for finding copyright in-
fringement because any legal protection of intellectual property is
only as strong as the potential for enforcing the protection against a
wrongdoer. In copyright law, the standard used to find infringement
is the substantial similarity between the two works at issue.60 How-
ever, in reality, it is not likely a court would even get to the point of
considering the substantial similarity between two Web sites because
the look and feel of a Web site interface would not likely be copy-
rightable subject matter, as pointed out in the previous discussion.
For the sake of analysis, if the total concept of the Web site was
deemed copyrightable subject matter, then the substantial similarity
between the interfaces would be considered. Unfortunately, the
judge-made tests that are applied for finding substantial similarity of
works that contain arguably functional elements is not uniform
among the circuits.
The primary problem with finding a substantial similarity be-
tween two Web site interfaces in most circuits, such that copyright
infringement can be found, is that usually only similarities between
protectable expression are compared. The circuits have struggled
with exactly how to filter out or dissect the protectable elements from
those elements that are not copyrightable subject matter, and there is
still not a clear answer.61 For instance, many elements in a Web site
59. Bruce G. Joseph and David A. Vogel, Copyright Protection of Software and Compi-
lations: A Review of Critical Developments 1991-1996,441 PL/PAT 369, 383 (May 1996).
60. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,468-9 (2d Cir. 1946).
61. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993),
Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1993); Engineering
Dynamics v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994), MiTek Holdings, Inc. v.
Arce Eng'g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1994), Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.
2d (BNA) 1225 (11th Cir. 1995), Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1994). Further discussion about the Ninth Circuit's approach towards computer user inter-
faces is found infra Part I[F][1].
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interface or computer interface may be considered merely functional
or found to be merely ideas as a result of the Merger Doctrine 2, such
that they do not qualify for copyright protection. So, a defendant
could copy all these unprotectable elements because they would not
be considered in the substantial similarity comparison. Again, the
real problem with copyright protection of Web site interfaces re-
volves around what constitutes copyrightable subject matter.
The Second Circuit pioneered the "Abstraction, Filtration,
Comparison" test for analyzing substantial similarity of protectable
elements in the case Computer Associates v. Altai.63 This test, or
similar variations, is also used in other circuits. Basically, the levels
of structural "abstraction" found in a given work are determined in
order to identify what is idea and what is expression. This is not well
defined in the cases, and is thus, for lack of a better word, abstract.
Then, ideas which are dictated by efficiency, are filtered out of the
allegedly infringed work. This process arguably leaves only ele-
ments protectable by copyright. But, there are many different ways
to make a computer program and interface efficient, so this exclusion
seems to be too broad. In the final step of the test, the elements that
are left are compared to see if there was copying by the alleged
wrongdoer. However, in the case of a the user interface, often times
by this point there would be nothing left to compare, so inf ngement
would not be found. Thus, in reality, a Web site owner could not en-
force his rights against an infringer.
The substantial similarity standard can be proven with circum-
stantial evidence that the wrongdoer had access to the work to copy
it, or with direct evidence of copying. So, it is not a tremendously
difficult standard to prove, especially in the case of Web sites, due to
the ease of accessing the sites. The problem is how courts filter out
certain elements before even comparing similarities. Even worse for
those pursuing copyright infringement of a Web site, it is likely that
the problem for a Web site owner will originate with the lack of
copyrightable subject matter in the user interface, even before sub-
stantial similarity is considered.
62 The Merger Doctrine stands for the notion that when an idea is so closely merged
with the expression in the work, then the expression is actually submerged by the idea and no
copyright protection is available. See MELVILLE B. NIAMER & DAVID NIMMER, I NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][3] (1996).
63. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 775 F. Supp 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd in part, va-
cated in part, remanded, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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E. History of Look and Feel Protection of Computer Programs
The revisions to the Copyright Act of 1976 indicate that Con-
gress intended to protect computer programs under copyright law."
Unfortunately, the statute does not explicitly state that copyright
protection extends beyond the source and object code of a program to
the look and feel of the computer program, which includes the crea-
tive screen display and keystroke combinations in the user interface.65
But, case law dealing with the copyright protection of video games
offers some confirmation that at least the visual screen display por-
tion of a computer program's user interface can be protected by copy-
right. Although the federal circuits are not always consistent in the
area of copyright law, insights can still be gained by reviewing a case
from another circuit.
The prominent case Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
sumer Electronics Corp." helps support the argument that a screen
display in a user interface may be extended copyright protection as an
audiovisual work.67 This case started a trend which open the scope of
what subject matter is protected by copyright. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari, leaving the decision unchallenged, so it can be re-
lied upon when deciding the scope of copyright protection of a Web
site user interface.
The copyright at issue in the case did not involve the underlying
code of the computer program, but instead the screen display copy-
right in an audiovisual work.6" To analyze the substantial similarity
of the screens, the Seventh Circuit considered the similarities of the
game characters in both computer games.69 Defendants used K.C.
Munchkin "gobblers" and "ghost monsters" which were similar in
both appearance and concept to Atari's "Pac-Man. ' 70 Even though
there was not exact copying of the screen displays by the Defendant,
the court found that Defendant's game captured the "total concept
64. 17U.S.C.§§ 101, 117(1994).
65. "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
"Statements and instructions" to "bring about a certain result" clearly includes the source and
object code of a computer program, but the interactive visual display generated by the program
or "look and feel" of the program seems unprotected by the Act.
66. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 652 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1982).
67. Id. at 607, 614.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id. at 617-620.
70. Id. at 611.
PROTECTION OF WEB SITE INTERFACES
and feel" of Atari's game.71 This case opened the door for protection
of the overall presentation and "feel" of video game screen displays,
but the Seventh Circuit court did not address how far this theory of
copyright protection should be extended. It is unclear from the case
if original expression contained in screen displays in other operating
environments would be copyrightable. 72
Soon after this case, "registering the 'look and feel' of all com-
puter programs became routine." 73 Copyright exists the minute the
work is fixed in a tangible medium, but in order for a copyright
owner to enforce his rights against an infringer and gain a remedy
under the Copyright Act, the copyright must be registered. First,
"the Copyright Office... allowed registration of visual displays ei-
ther as separate audiovisual works or as separate literary works."74
Subsequently, the Office decided to allow registration of an underly-
ing computer program to extend to all the elements of the audiovisual
screen display that the program generated. 75 In 1987, the Office held
public hearings to decide how to proceed with copyright protection of
computer programs. 76 Then in 1988, the Office adopted internal
guidelines to support single registration for all aspects of computer
programs, including the visual screen displays.77 However, it is still
unclear exactly what subject matter is covered in the copyright pro-
tection of computer programs. Thus, enforcing a single registration
for all aspects of the computer program in court is unpredictable.
While each case must be examined separately on its facts, mak-
ing the extraction of guidelines from case law is difficult. The exist-
ing copyright laws are more readily applicable to individual graphic
elements in a screen display or user interface, but it is hard to tell
how far copyright protection will extend beyond source and object
code and if it will adequately protect the entire look and feel of com-
puter user interfaces. 78 Likewise, it is difficult to pinpoint the look
and feel protection of Web site user interfaces even after Atari.
71. Id.at619-620.
72. See generally Jack Russo & Douglas K. Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel"
of Computer Software, 2 COMPUTER LAW 1 (Feb. 1985) (provides more analysis about how far
copyright protection will be extended to other operating environments).
73. Russo & Nafziger, supra note 3, at 575.
74. Id. at 576.
75. Id. at 576.
76. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 152-155 (1988).
77. Id. at 155.
78. Russo & Nafziger, supra note 3, at 577.
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Lastly, it is difficult to know if only the graphic visual screens
alone are copyrightable, or whether the icon buttons are individually
copyrightable too, or if graphic visual screens in combination with
icon buttons, as a whole, are protectable as the look and feel of a
computer program user interface or Web site user interface. Copy-
right protection for video game graphical interface is at best unpre-
dictable. This, in turn, leaves many questions about the copyright
protection for Web site user interfaces on the Internet.
F. Cases that Diminish Copyright Protection of the Look and
Feel of User Interfaces
The following two cases provide insights into the analysis a
court would likely follow to determine copyright protection of a
computer user interface. It is logical that this reasoning could apply
to Web site user interfaces on the Internet because they serve the
same purpose as computer user interfaces. Both interfaces allow a
user to interact with the presentation displayed on the screen. Basi-
cally, the interface provides a means of communication between the
user and the computer.
1. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation
The'leading case that sheds light on the applicability of copy-
right protection to computer program graphical user interfaces is Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation.79 ("Apple") While the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's approach to solving the
copyright issues, the district court's opinion provides more complete
and valuable insights about copyright protection of the look and feel
of a computer user interface. 0 This case denied copyright protection
at the substantial similarity phase of looking at infringement, but the
substantial similarity test has a great deal to do with deciphering
copyrightable subject matter contained in the interface. Regardless
of any possible separate protection for each individual element in the
interface, the court clearly rejected the approach of considering the
entire look and feel of an interface to find copyright protection of the
whole interface.8' Due to the court's filtering out of subject matter
that was individually unprotected by copyright, the decision left most
79. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), afd,
35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1016; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d at 1445.
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of the important aspects of Apple's user interface unprotected under
copyright.8 2
Apple sued Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") and Hewlett-
Packard for copyright infringement of the graphical user interface on
its Macintosh computer. 3 The graphical interface included overlap-
ping windows, iconic representation, object opening/closing, menus
and iconic manipulation. The case involved complex issues about
licensing agreements, whereby Apple granted Microsoft a limited li-
cense to use its visual displays in Microsoft's software, and in turn
Microsoft licensed these visual displays to a third party, Hewlett-
Packard. 85 So, the court ruled against Apple on many of its copyright
claims, due to the licensing agreement. 86 But, the main value of the
case to this comment is the manner in which the court reasoned the
proper scope of copyright protection of graphical user interfaces.
The user interface of a computer program is protectable under
copyright if "on the particular facts of each case, the component in
question qualifies as an expression of an idea."187 To decide the scope
of protection allowed for the expression in the user interface, the
court employed a two-step analysis for finding copyright infringe-
ment.88 According to the test, the disputed works are compared for
substantial similarity under an "extrinsic test" (an objective stan-
dard).8 9 Then, once the court finds that there is a substantial similar-
ity in the essence of the plaintiff's work, an "intrinsic test" (using a
subjective standard) is applied.90 The intrinsic test is limited to com-
paring only those elements of a work that can be the subject of copy-
right, so this prong is not considering the work as a whole, but in-
stead comparing the work's individual components.
One problem for Apple was that analytic dissection was used
under part one of the test to filter out which elements were protect-
82. Id. at 1028-1034.
83. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp at 1006, 1015.
84. Id. at 1006, 1024.
85. Id. at 1015 and 1016.
86. Id. at 1016.
87. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Controls Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989).
88. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
89. Id. The court compares the "ideas" of the works at issue to determine ifa substantial
similarity exists between the expression of the two works. To progress to the second prong of
the test, the similarities between the two works at issue must come from protected elements of
the works, not from unprotectable features.
90. Id.
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able in the interface.91 Then, only protectable features were com-
pared for similarities.92 This dissection approach means that if the
similarities found between two original works stem from features in
the graphical interface that are individually not protectable by copy-
right, the court will not even get to step two of the test for infringe-
ment.93 This clearly leaves the copyright protection available for a
Web site user interface diminished because many elements in the in-
terface will not be considered copyrightable subject matter individu-
ally, even though they contribute to the look and feel of the interface.
Apple argued that the court should consider the entire look and feel
of the graphical interfaces, regardless of the protection allowed for
each individual element of the visual display.94 However, the court
clearly discounted this line of reasoning by employing the two-step
test, which filtered out unprotectable elements before similarities
between the two works were even considered.95 This dissection proc-
ess defines the scope of the plaintiffs copyright, such that the
"intrinsic" step of the test is not even needed if there are no protect-
able elements to compare. 96
When filtering out elements, or dissecting the work, to identify
the protectable features of a plaintiffs work, the court looked at doc-
trines used to decipher the line between an idea and expression.97 For
example, Apple could protect the expression or particular manner in
which it displayed the garbage can icon for deleted materials, but not
the general idea of using a waste receptacle for deleted material. 98 It
is clear from the case that only expressions are protected and ideas
that merge with expression only get copyright protection from identi-
cal copying.99 Although some elements in a graphical interface may
be set aside and only granted protection from identical copying, this
is actually a limited form of copyright protection. So, certain expres-
sions that do not qualify individually for copyright protection will be
unprotected in an interface, even if taken together with individually
protected elements these expressions could actually qualify for copy-
91. Id. at 1020.
92. Id.
93. Id. See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
94. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
95. Id. at 1021.
96. Id.; see also Brown Bag v. Symantec, 960 F.2d. 1465, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992).
97. Id. at 1021.
98. Id. at 1035-1036.
99. Id. at 1021. But see Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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right protection. For example, if an element is found to be lacking
originality or is functional, it would not be included in determining
the total expression to be protected in an interface. Dissection clearly
hurts any overall copyright protection that might be available for the
graphical interface and likewise a Web site user interface.
While Apple lost on many claims of similarities between its
graphical interfaces and Microsoft's interfaces, it is important to no-
tice that this outcome could be the result of asserting the wrong cause
of action. Many arguments made by Apple to persuade the court to
grant copyright protection of all the elements contained in the inter-
face as a whole were actually trademark arguments. Apple argued
that "to understand the distinctive appearance of the Macintosh inter-
face, one needs to consider not only the individual elements that
make up the appearance of the interface but also the way those ele-
ments are arranged and interact with one another to create the con-
sistent and distinctive Macintosh interface." 10 This basic argument
could fit under a trade dress theory because the references to
"distinctive appearance" and the arrangement of elements in the in-
terface sound like references to trademark law.1 1 So, it makes sense
that the district court quickly discounted these arguments under a
copyright analysis. The court reasoned that the "look and feel" of
Apple's interface was actually just a "collection of visual displays
and user commands designed to render use of the computer."' 102 The
court deemed these command elements of the interface utilitarian or
functional, so they were not protectable under copyright law when
viewed together with other protectable elements in the interface.10 3
Apple's claims may have been more successful under a trade
dress theory. It seems copyright protection of Web site user inter-
faces will be limited, at best, after Apple. It is likely that many ele-
ments in a Web site interface could be viewed as functional and only
needed to operate the site. These functional elements will be dis-
sected out of the whole look and feel of the interface when copyright
protection is considered. Thus, the interface could be left virtually
unprotectable by copyright because a large portion of many Web
100. Id. at 1022.
101. The threshold question for trademark infringement is whether the mark is distinctive.
Trade dress protection considers the overall impression of a product and the arrangement or
combinations of graphics in a product's packaging. See Ambercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
102. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, 1022-23 (N.D. Cal.
1992), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. Id. at 1023.
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sites consist of the command buttons used to navigate the information
in a particular manner. The feasibility of successfully applying a
trade dress theory to Web site user interfaces will be discussed in Part
IV of this comment.
2. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of protecting the com-
mand hierarchy portion of a computer program's user interface under
copyright law in the case Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter-
national, Inc.04 ("Borland") It is difficult to predict what impact
this will have on other types of computer program environments, like
Web site interfaces, since the command hierarchy component of the
interface at issue in the case, without consideration of the visual
screen display, was not held to be protectable under copyright law.
However, the case could cause the protection of an interface's total
look and feel to be diminished in the future.
"In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. 05
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the menu
structure of Lotus 1-2-3 was a 'method of operation' and thus, un-
protected by copyright."' 10 6 The Supreme Court affirmed this deci-
sion, 10 7 so Web site owners on the Internet seeking protection of their
valuable intellectual property are bound by this decision. Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court did not issue a written opinion in the case,
so we must look at the First Circuit's reasoning for the decision. 08
Even so, the proper scope of copyright protection of software is still
difficult to ascertain because the First Circuit did not provide a clear
justification for its result. 09 It is hard to tell if the totality of Web site
user interfaces, which is distinguishable from the menu structures
standing alone, will be afforded copyright protection. The following
discussion will explore the First Circuit's decision in Borland be-
104. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (hereinafter "Borland"
in the main text).
105. Lotus Dev. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
106. Id. at 816.
107. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
108. See Robert L. Bocehino, Jr., Note, Computers, Copyrights and Functionality: The
First Circuit's Decision in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 9 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 467,467 (1996).
109. See id. at467.
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cause this analysis would likely be applied to future cases dealing
with copyright protection of Web site interfaces.
The sole question on appeal in the First Circuit was "whether
the Lotus menu command hierarchy is copyrightable subject mat-
ter." 110 The command hierarchy, standing alone, had to be an origi-
nal expression in order to be afforded copyright protection.' The
issue of whether the creative screen displays were capable of being
copyrightable was not before the court."2 So, it is undecided if the
visual displays and the hierarchy, considered together, would have
been a protectable look and feel of the program's interface. How-
ever, the case pointed out that if the expressive aspects of the screen
displays were not needed to operate the computer program, they
would not necessarily be deemed unprotectable methods of opera-
tion." 3 Thus, the separate protection of the visual screen display in a
Web site interface is not necessarily affected by the court's decision
in Borland. 114
In Borland, the First Circuit relied on the express language
in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act"' to explain its application to the
case: "We think that 'method of operation,' as that term is used
in § 102(b), refers to the means by which a person operates some-
thing, whether it be a car.., or a computer."" 6 The Court stated that
the Lotus 1-2-3 command hierarchy was a method of operation be-
cause the hierarchy "provided the means by which users control and
operate Lotus 1-2-3."117 Just because Lotus made some creative de-
cisions about the arrangement and word choices available for the
command hierarchy did not mean the hierarchy was copyrightable
subject matter. Once something is deemed a method of operation
under copyright law, it does not matter how original or creative it is,
there cannot be copyright protection. This is the main problem of
applying Borland to Web site user interfaces. Arguably, a user inter-
face is used to operate a program. A Web site user interface may be
original and minimally creative, but if it is likened to the command
110. Lotus Dev. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (Ist Cir. 1995).
111. Id. at 813.
112. "As they are not before us on appeal, we take no position on whether the Lotus 1-2-3
screen displays constitute original expression capable of being copyrighted." Id at 816 n. 10.
113. Id.at516.
114. There are other potential problems with protecting the visual screen display of a Web
site interface under copyright law, as discussed infra Part H[D].
115. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
116. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (Ist Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 815.
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hierarchies at issue in Borland, then copyright protection will not be
extended to the entire look and feel of the user interface.
Furthermore, the First Circuit likened the command hierarchy of
Lotus 1-2-3 to the buttons used to control a video cassette recorder
("VCR")." 8 This analogy to unprotectable VCR buttons seems to
support the notion that the command buttons and icons in a Web site
user interface that help a user navigate the site will not be protectable
elements under copyright. The First Circuit reasoned that users oper-
ate the VCR by pressing buttons that perform certain functions." 9
Just because these buttons are arranged in a certain manner, arguably
a creative manner, does not make the buttons a literary work or an
expression. 120 "Instead, the buttons are themselves the 'method of
operating' the VCR.' 2' According to the First Circuit, choosing a
command on the Lotus screen was analogous to pressing a button on
a VCR.'2 Since the Lotus menu commands were necessary for oper-
ating and using the program, the command hierarchy was considered
a method of operation.'21 The mechanisms for navigating a Web site
are also necessary for operating the Web site and gaining information
from it. Pursuant to the Borland decision, it is easy to see that a court
might not extend copyright protection to these command aspects of a
Web site user interface. Thus, a large portion of a Web site user in-
terface may be left unprotected by copyright as a result of this deci-
sion. Further, these unprotectable elements would be filtered out
when a court considers substantial similarity for infringement. So,
when this case's reasoning is coupled with analytic dissection, the
look and feel of the entire Web site interface would likely be unpro-
tected by copyright.
There is a chance that there could still be some copyright pro-
tection of the command part of a Web site user interface if the com-
mand buttons or icons, which navigate the site, are deemed mere la-
bels.124 The court does not directly address this possibility because
Lotus 1-2-3 did not design their interface in this fashion. However,
the creative labels used on a Web site to jump to another screen or
activate a hyperlink might get copyright protection if the labels could
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be designed without solely being an operation. Unfortunately, this
would be a difficult argument to advance because the only way to
navigate a Web site is by "pushing" the buttons, like in the court's
analogy to VCR buttons. Thus, it is difficult to predict how a court
will rule on the copyright protection of the command elements con-
tained in a Web site user interface's look and feel.
To further complicate any predictions about the feasibility of
protecting Web site user interfaces under copyright, the First Circuit
relied on considerations of competition and public policy to decide
that the Lotus 1-2-3 command hierarchy was not eligible for copy-
right protection.125 These considerations are not as relevant when
dealing with the Internet. The concerns over program function com-
patibility and writing macros for the simplicity of operation, which
were present in Borland, are not issues when protecting Web site in-
terfaces. It made sense in Borland that forcing a user of several dif-
ferent computer programs to learn all the different ways to operate
similar functions in each program was not practical. 26 But, in cyber-
space, many Web sites are visually set up differently, operate in dif-
ferent ways and are used to represent different entities and products.
Other sites collect and present information from many individual en-
tities, so they do not need to have functioning mechanisms that are
similar to other Web sites. Thus, the policy considerations so heavily
relied upon in Borland may not be as relevant when considering the
copyright protection of the keystroke commands or icons in Web site
interfaces, either as individual protectable elements or as the entire
look and feel of the interface.
Arguably, some buttons used to operate command aspects of a
Web site user interface may be compatible with other sites because
the software used to create Web sites only allows a limited number of
choices. In addition, most Internet users want some standardization
and compatibility between commands for convenience. These argu-
ments could add fuel to the position that the look and feel of Web site
interfaces should not be copyrightable, but it is unclear how much
weight a court would give these arguments. Standardization and
compatibility would perpetuate convenience for the Internet, but they
are not necessary for it to function as a marketplace for goods and
services. Also, future innovations will likely create an infinite num-
ber of options for generating buttons, icons, or visuals on a Web site.
125. See Bocchino, supra note 108 at 472.
126. Lotus Dev. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d at 818.
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Since the Supreme Court in Borland did not address protection
of the Lotus 1-2-3 visual screen displays alone or the effect of con-
sidering the visual displays and command hierarchy together as a
whole, copyright protection of the look and feel of an entire interface
is still unclear after the case. It is feasible that some graphics in a
Web site interface could be separately protected under the audiovis-
ual category of § 102(a), 127 if the graphics are original and creative.
But, this kind of copyright protection would only protect some as-
pects of a Web site user interface and not the presentation in its en-
tirety, i.e., its look and feel. This overall concept and impression rep-
resents the business image generated in consumers' minds which
affects their buying decisions. It is the overall impression and com-
plete layout or organization that is so valuable to a Web site owner
and gives the owner a competitive advantage in the marketplace be-
cause it grabs the attention of consumers and helps build brand rec-
ognition. This overall impression or look and feel carries out a con-
sistent theme, so a Web site can stand out among the massive volume
of Web sites out there.
It is apparent that copyright protection will fall short of com-
pletely protecting a Web site owner from someone else using his
creative Web site interface look and feel. First, it may be difficult to
find sufficient originality in a Web site interface for copyright pro-
tection if the Web sitemerely presents and organizes facts, as seen in
the Feist128 case. Second, many individual elements in a user inter-
face may be left unprotected after subject matter is dissected by the
substantial similarity analysis for infringement, as seen in Apple.
Third, individual elements or the entire Web site may be deemed a
method of operation or fall under other § 102(b) exceptions which
exclude copyright protection of certain types of subject matter, as
seen in Borland.29 Finally, even if some copyright protection is af-
forded, it may not be for the entire look and feel of the Web site, and
it is this total presentation that is so valuable for marketing purposes
in cyberspace.
127. "Works of authorship include the following categories: ... (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works .... " 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6).
128. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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IV. TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF WEB SITE USER INTERFACES
A. General Theory of Trademark Protection
Trademark law protects the public from being confused about
the source of a particular product. 30 According to the Lanham Act, 31
which provides federal protection of trademarks, a mark is used "to
identify and distinguish ... goods... from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown."' 32 Consumers assume that products or services
from a single source remain consistent, so trademarks enable a con-
sumer to rely on their previous buying experiences when making new
purchasing decisions among competing products and services. If a
consumer is confused about the source or sponsorship of a product,
that consumer might make a poorly informed buying decision.
Trademark law attempts to encourage businesses to invest in the
"good will" generated by their image, reputation, and products'. If
this "good will" can be linked to a specific trademark and protected
from consumer confusion under the law, then businesses will also be
encouraged to make products of a consistent quality, which clearly
benefits the public. 34
Consumers are buying products and services via the Internet at
increasing frequencies. Even new commercials advertise that it is
simple to set up "store fronts" on the Internet.3 5 Consumers must be
able to identify and obtain the goods they desire. Also, a business
must be able to retain an advantage in the marketplace from the good
130. The Lanham Act provides that infringement of a trademark occurs when a defendant
uses a mark in a manner listed in the statute and "such use is likely to cause confusion or to
cause mistake, or to deceive..." 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). The Restatement of Unfair Com-
petition refers to this "likelihood of confusion" standard for protecting consumers in the mar-
ketplace. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPmTITON §§ 20-23 (1995).
131. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1995 and Supp. 1997).
132. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994); see also Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of
Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L. REV. 769, 773 (1991).
133. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPET-
TION § 2.10 (3d ed. 1996).
134. Trademark law strives to prevent a competitor from gaining an unfair benefit from
consumer confusion as to source because this confusion hinders competition. "If such confu-
sion occurs, meaningful competition is frustrated because '[w]ithout some ... method of prod-
uct identification, informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in equality,
could not exist."' Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 940 F. Supp. 663, 666-
667 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) quoting Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968).
135. AT&T started running television commercials in October 1997 telling consumers to
use AT&T products for the purpose of setting up a "store front" on the Internet.
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will contained in its image and reputation, which is reflected in a
Web site user interface. Thus, there is a great need for trademark
protection of a business's trade dress that is represented by its Web
site user interface on the Internet.
B. Basic Differences Between Copyright and Trademark
Protection
The idea of protecting consumers from confusion about the
source of a product is very different from protecting an author's
original work under copyright. This basic difference is why trade-
mark law may be better suited to protect Web site user interfaces.
Copyright law does not acknowledge the protection of a consumer's
association with a particular product or the good will generated from
source identification of a product. Copyright law looks at the simi-
larity between two types of expression, while trademark law focuses
on the likelihood of consumer confusion.13 6 While similarities be-
tween two trademarks will provide evidence that there could be con-
sumer confusion, the similarities alone between the marks are not
dispositive of confusion. 137 So, while there may not be an infringe-
ment of rights under copyright law, due to a lack of substantial simi-
larity between the Web sites, there may still be an infringement under
trademark law because trademark infringement is based on a differ-
ent rationale; preventing consumer confusion. This is helpful in look
and feel cases, in light of the problem with the filtration and dissec-
tion methods that are used for finding substantial similarity in copy-
right law.
With Web site user interfaces, something could be expressed in
a different manner, but still mislead a consumer because the overall
impression from the visual display triggers an association with the
wrong source. For example, a seller of Mexican spices might have a
particular Mexican villa motif on his Web site, while another com-
pany operated a site with a different colored and designed Mexican
villa motif for selling its products on the Internet and there would not
necessarily be copyright infringement. However, if these two com-
136. To find copyright infringement, a court will compare the similarities between the two
works at issue to decide if the similarities are substantial. But, to find trademark infringement,
a court is concerned with whether the public will be confused if two trademarks exist side by
side in the marketplace, i.e., are the two trademarks confusingly similar.
137. The similarity between the marks represents only one factor considered in deciding
likelihood of confusion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1995); see
also Polaroid Co. v. Polarad Elecs. Co., 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1961).
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panies were competitors and prospective consumers were confused
about who was selling which goods on a particular Web site, there
could be a trademark infringement of the look and feel of the Web
site under a trade dress theory.
The language in the United States Constitution granting Con-
gress the power to pass laws to protect copyrights does not contain a
natural right of authors to own their works."8 It is clear that the pub-
lic interest of promoting "the progress of science, and useful arts"
takes precedence over an author's limited statutory right to control
the copying and distribution of his original work because the public
interest is expressly mentioned in the Constitution.'39 It is no secret
that the Constitution preempts meanings and applications of federal
laws when they are directly at odds.140 Since the public interest of
fostering competition and creative arts carries greater weight than the
author's rights, it is likely that copyright protection is not as strong as
trademark protection in the context of a volatile commercial medium
like the Internet.
There is a strong public interest in protecting trademarks be-
cause distinguishing goods and services helps to reduce consumer
confusion as to the source of goods in the marketplace and helps to
avoid unfair competitive practices. Thus, copyright protection can
have a more limited application than trademark protection to Web
site interfaces, due to the competitive nature of the Internet. In addi-
tion, opening up copyright protection to include the look and feel of
Web site interfaces could dilute the protection afforded for other
works of authorship. Trade dress is already more on point for pro-
tecting the overall arrangement, design, or look and feel of a com-
puter or Web site user interface, so it seems a better theory to apply.
In addition, copyright protection lasts for a limited duration,
while trademark protection is infinite, provided it is maintained.'4 '
138. The argument that an author has an automatic "natural" or basic right in his own
creations is a debated concept. Many believe that this "natural right" in copyright is reflected
in the Constitution, even though it is not expressly stated. Harvard Professor Nathaniel Shaler
stated, "l]intellectual property is, after all, the only absolute possession in the world... [t]he
man who brings out of the nothingness some child of his thought has rights therein which can-
not belong to any other sort of property." ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIEs 29 (4th ed. 1993). The Copyright Act of 1976 clearly does not
incorporate this natural right idea because all the rights protected are limited in scope and not
absolute as if they are natural rights.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
140. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994). For trademarks, registration must be renewed every five
years and the trademark owner must take necessary precautions to prevent the mark from los-
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Web sites are dynamic and always changing, so the perpetual life of a
trademark does not seem like an advantage over copyright protection.
However, long term investments in source identification through
trade dress could create an advantage for some established companies
when they decide to use their trade dress on a new medium, like the
Internet or whatever new form of communication is used in the fu-
ture.
C. Trade Dress
1. Theory of Protection
Trade dress is a form of trademark protection. "Trade dress"
refers to the "total image and overall appearance of a product".,42 Or
put another way, it is the "manner in which the goods or services are
presented to prospective purchasers... "to indicate source. 143 Trade
dress encompasses the "arrangement of identifying characteristics or
decoration connected to a product, whether by packaging or other-
wise, intended to make the source of the product distinguishable from
another and to promote it for sale." 144 Once source significance is
attached to the appearance or image of the goods and services offered
for sale, "the appearance then functions as a trademark." 145
For protecting Web site user interfaces, the focus is not so much
on the appearance of the product itself, but on the interface display
used in presenting the product and the image of its source to pro-
spective customers.1 46 Remember, the statute states that decoration
can be " ... connected to a product, whether by packaging or other-
ing distinctiveness. For example, controlling any licensed uses of the mark and exerting ef-
forts to prevent the mark from becoming generic are typical maintenance requirements. These
"requirements" are not statutory, but precautions that case law has mandated in order for a
trademark owner to be successful when enforcing his rights against an alleged infringer.
142. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S 763 at 764-65 n. 1 quoting Blue Bell
Bio-Medic al v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 865 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989); see also International
Jensen v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993), Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1989).
143. RESTATEMENT (THID) OF UNFAIR COMPETION § 16 cmt. a (1995).
144. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F,2d 1235,
1239 (6th Cir. 1991).
145. RESTATEmENT (THli) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995).
146. "'Trade dress' traditionally includes the appearance of labels, wrappers, and contain-
ers used in packaging a product as well as displays and other materials used in presenting the
product to prospective purchasers. The design features of the product itself are also sometimes
included within the meaning of 'trade dress,'...." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995).
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wise," so the interface itself can act to distinguish the product. 47
The Web site is like a large store display for products or services of a
particular entity. However, this Internet display is better than a
poster or mannequin because it is interactive, much like a live dem-
onstration. The trade dress at issue when evaluating the total look
and feel of a Web site includes the visual screen display and the
command buttons or icons used for navigating the site. Trade dress is
specifically concerned with protecting the overall organization and
concept presented in a display used to present a product or source to a
potential consumer. 148 So, trade dress is well suited to protect the en-
tire look and feel of a Web site interface, which is essentially the
overall concept presented in the display.
2. Statutory Protection
Trade dress registration can be costly, time consuming, and dif-
ficult due to filing requirements under § 2 of the Lanham Act. 149
While it is possible to register a trade dress, a business's trade dress
would not likely be registered in practice because it can be expensive.
It is particularly difficult to register the trade dress on Web sites be-
cause the sites are dynamic and frequently changing. Also, an entre-
preneur or small business with a Web site on the Internet may not
have legal counsel to advise them about the pitfalls of doing business
on the Internet. Fortunately, an unregistered mark or an unregistered
trade dress can gain protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 50
The case law decided under § 43(a) has broadened the scope of what
147 Ferrari v. Roberts, 944 F.2d at 1239.
148. In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals' definition of trade dress. "The District Court instructed
the jury: '[Tirade dress is the total image of the business ... ' Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Ca-
bana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992). The Court of Appeals quoted the definition of a
trade dress described in Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. CM-Bad, Inc.: "The 'trade dress' of a product
is essentially its total image and overall appearance." Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc.,
864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E
Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (shape of a sports car); L.A. Gear, Inc. v.
Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 988 F.2d 1117
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (design of an athletic shoe).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been applied for
protection of trade dress, unregistered marks, and protection from false advertising, commer-
cial disparagement and passing off. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 133,
§ 27.03[l][b].
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is protectable as a trade dress, so Web site user interfaces have a bet-
ter chance of being protected under § 43(a). 151
The analysis for a registered and an unregistered trademark or
trade dress are very similar 52 The main advantage with a registered
mark comes from the fact that a court presumes a registered mark's
validity in an infringement action.153 The main requirements for va-
lidity are that the mark is used to identify a single source of goods in
commerce, the mark is distinctive and the mark is nonfunctional. An
invalid mark would prevent a plaintiff from going forward with an
infringement action. This is important because trademark protection
is only valuable if the owner of the mark can enforce his rights and
stop another party from using a trademark that causes consumer con-
fusion. There are clear advantages to registration, but protecting
Web site user interfaces will likely be more feasible under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.'I "
Section 43(a) 55 "protects against confusion or the likelihood of
confusion as to source, sponsorship or association between the goods
and services of competitors in the marketplace." '5 Basically, this
portion of the Lanham Act provides a cause of action for plaintiffs
who have been injured by deceptive commercial practices that cause
consumer confusion 57 Further, the scope of trade dress protection
under § 43(a) is generally broader than trademark protection under
the statute. As one court noted:
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763 (1992) (theme, motif and design of a Mexican Restaurant); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12
F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (design of a faucet); Braun Inc. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 975
F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (design of a blender); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili
E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
152. J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection -A
Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 389, 392 (1993).
153. "Any registration... shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
mark, and of the registrant's ownership of the mark .... 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1994).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(a) Any person who, or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact or false or misleading representation of fact, which
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person ....
156. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 7.03[A][2] (3d ed. 1995).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
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Trade dress protection is broader in scope than trademark protec-
tion, both because it protects aspects of packaging and product de-
sign that cannot be registered for trademark protection and because
evaluation of trade dress infringement claims requires the court to
focus on the plaintiff's entire selling image, rather than the nar-
rower single facet of trademark. 58
As stated earlier, many entrepreneurs and small businesses who
use the Internet may not have a registered trade dress due to expense.
These entrepreneurs and small businesses could still enjoy protection
under § 43(a).159 Thus, § 43(a) will likely be the best means to pro-
tect the trade dress contained in a Web site user interface, so long as
the elements of distinctiveness and nonfunctional are satisfied.
3. Requirements for Trade Dress Protection
To be eligible for protection as a trademark under the Lanham
Act, 160 the trade dress must be inherently distinctive, or have acquired
secondary meaning, and be nonfunctional.' 6' Once a trade dress is
deemed distinctive and nonfunctional, the ultimate inquiry for in-
fringement is whether another trade dress causes a likelihood of con-
fusion in consumers' minds. 62 This likelihood of confusion is not
only the basis for finding an infringement of a trade dress, but also
the basic rationale behind why a trade dress is protected. This stan-
dard would be potentially easier for a plaintiff to prove than the sub-
stantial similarity needed for copyright infringement. The trademark
standard for infringement is more favorable for protecting Web site
interfaces because it focuses on consumer perceptions and market
factors-not the actual creative expression in the site.
a. Distinctiveness
To protect a Web site user interface under a trade dress theory,
the first issue is whether the site's look and feel is distinctive, either
inherently or due to acquired secondary meaning. a63 Distinctiveness
means that a consumer is capable of identifying one source's product
158. Bauer Lamp Co., v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 1991) (for trade dress
infringement the three elements a plaintiff must prove are: (1) the product is distinctive or ac-
quired secondary meaning; (2) the elements or features in question are nonfunctional and (3)
the similarities between the two products are confusingly similar).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
161. RE STATEMENT (rHiRD) oF UNFAIRCOMPETION § 16 (1995).
162. See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
163. RESTATEMENT (MRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMrON § 13 (1995).
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and distinguishing that source's product from another source's
goods. 164 The distinctiveness classifications from Ambercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World 65 have been applied to trade dress pro-
tection under § 43(a), and accepted by the Supreme Court.'6 So, ap-
plication of the classifications to a Web site's trade dress should not
be any different.
According to Ambercrombie, the two highest categories on the
classification scale are arbitrary or fanciful marks, and suggestive
marks, which are considered inherently distinctive.16 7 They are con-
sidered the two "highest" categories because these types of marks
have a high level of distinctiveness by their very nature. For exam-
ple, using an apple symbol for a computer is an arbitrary mark be-
cause it has an unexpected association with the product. The third
category is descriptive "marks" which can become distinctive once
they sufficiently acquire secondary meaning. 68 For example, calling
a machine that makes pickles a "Pickle Machine" is a descriptive la-
bel for the product. A mark achieves secondary meaning when the
primary significance of a product's trade dress in the minds of con-
sumers is not the product but the source of the product. 69 It must be
proven that consumers link the trade dress to a single source, even if
the consumer is not aware of that particular source or the source is
anonymous. 70 The final category is generic marks which are never
protectable as a trademark or trade dress. 17' For example, using
"soda" for the name of a soft drink would just be using a generic
name for the product because it does not distinguish the product.
Sometimes, a once distinctive mark can become a generic term for a
certain type or class of products. For example, when someone uses
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
165. The distinctiveness scale was formulated by Judge Friendly in Ambercromble &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. Ambercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc, 537 F.2d
4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
166. The Fifth Circuit followed the Ambercrombie analysis to determine that the trade
dress of a Mexican restaurant was inherently distinctive in Two Pesos. Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). The Supreme Court then affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
ruling stating that the lower court was correct in applying the Ambercrombie classifications to
the facts. Id. at 773.
167. Ambercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc, 537 F.2d at 9. "Marks" includes
trade dress so, in the context of protecting a Web site interface, the interface is actually the
trademark.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995).
170. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 (1995).
1998] PROTECTION OF WEB SITE IN ERACES
"xerox" instead of saying "a copy", the trademark in the company
name Xerox can get diminished to the point that "xerox" is just an-
other noun for the word copy. To have a protectable trade dress, the
Web site interface must either be arbitrary or fanciful, suggestive, or
descriptive with acquired secondary meaning. However, as a practi-
cal matter it may be difficult for a Web site to acquire secondary
meaning when the site's design or layout is substantially changed or
frequently updated.
Some problems exist with finding arbitrary or fanciful distinct-
iveness in a Web site user interface as well. The features contained
in the visual display of a Web site interface would have to be creative
and not features necessarily found in other interfaces. This is not to
say that the "'packaging' of the product, or interface is 'inherently
distinctive' merely because it is not identical to features commonly
found in the marketplace." 172 However, Web site interface features
could not just reflect a "variation on a commonplace theme," instead
they would have to be so arbitrary that "one can assume without
proof that [the trade dress] automatically will be perceived.., as an
identifier of the source of the product."1 73
There are many ways to create a visual display through com-
puter graphics and an infinite number of graphical elements that an
owner could include in a Web site user interface. So, a creative
graphic screen display could satisfy the arbitrary requirement pro-
vided it was so unique that other sites would not necessarily possess
the same look and feel. However, the command or icon elements for
navigating the information could be considered commonplace in
many other sites. Fortunately, to find trade dress protection, a court
would likely consider the entire layout of the Web site interface, so
the inclusion of commonplace elements will not necessarily bar trade
dress protection.
The limited ways of presenting the buttons used for moving
about the site could present a problem with finding the whole site
distinctive because the buttons might be considered a standard or
merely functional. If the command buttons used to navigate the sight
are simple and standard, a court may just protect the visual graphics
in the screen display without including the buttons, even if the but-
tons are labeled creatively or have animation. Again, it is difficult to
172. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 133, § 8.02[4].
173. Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K. & K. Neckwear, Inc., 897 F. Supp 789, 794 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
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predict what features will be included in the look and feel of the in-
terface even when seeking protection under a trade dress theory,
rather than copyright. But, the potential for protection seems more
favorable than under a copyright theory.
Next, showing that the interface is suggestive as to its source
could present similar problems. "A term is suggestive if it requires
imagination, thought, and perception to reach a conclusion as to the
nature of the goods." 174 A consumer visiting a particular site must
use some imagination to understand the whole scheme of how the site
looks in order for the trade dress to be considered suggestive. But, if
mere observation only tells the consumer some descriptions about the
product in a basic sense, then there is arguably not a suggestive trade
dress. The consumer must identify with some source when he views
the Web site. It is more feasible that a consumer would see the
graphic presentation on the screen and perceive some "suggestion"
about the source, rather than some arbitrary or fanciful association.
Again, it would be difficult to show that seeing the creative
buttons or commands for navigating the information caused some
identification with the source. Many Web sites may have similar
buttons. The only way to protect the buttons and the graphic presen-
tation together would be to show that they are so unique or dependent
on each other for the overall look and feel of the interface that they
could not be separated out of the total trade dress impression. This
may be difficult to prove because similar command hierarchies for
navigating a Web site are used on the Internet. The command hierar-
chy would have to be elaborate and creative, so when it was consid-
ered with the totality of the interface the appropriate level of dis-
tinctiveness could be found in the look and feel of the interface.
b. Secondary Meaning
Trade dress protection of a descriptive mark requires secondary
meaning. 175 Secondary meaning is acquired distinctiveness that re-
sults from using the descriptive mark extensively, such that it identi-
fies a single source instead of just describing a product.176 Gaining
secondary meaning could be problematic for Web site user interfaces.
First, "a high degree of proof is necessary to establish secondary
174. Ambercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1994), Two Pesos, Inc., v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
769 (1992).
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(b) (1995).
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meaning."1 77 Second, showing secondary meaning is difficult be-
cause it takes time to establish a consumer's association of a product
with its source. If the trade dress in a Web site just describes the
business or products and is not elaborate and catchy to the consumer,
it will obviously take substantial time for association to the trade
dress to be built. Since Web sites are often changed and modified, it
may be difficult for a descriptive trade dress to ever acquire secon-
dary meaning such that it would be afforded trademark protection.
The best situation for a descriptive trade dress would be an elaborate
trade dress that is already used in other advertising materials for the
product or company, so that its use is already established when used
on the Web site. In this case, there would be a better chance that the
requisite level of secondary meaning could be shown in order for
distinctiveness to attach the descriptive trade dress.
Since it is crucial to find that there has been sufficient consumer
exposure to a particular trade dress in order to have secondary
meaning, a court may consider the following factors from the Third
Circuit: (1) the duration and exclusivity of the design's use; (2) the
amount and nature of advertising that emphasizes the design and its
distinctive, identifying features; (3) consumer survey evidence link-
ing the design to a single source; and (4) the defendant's intent in
copying the design. 178 These factors for finding secondary meaning
could be problematic when applied to Web site user interfaces.
The duration and exclusivity of all elements in use of a Web site
user interface design may not be very lengthy, due to frequent
changes and updates. Second, a Web site can often be a primary
source of advertising itself, so there may not be many other materials
beyond the Web site that reflect the trade dress of a business. Fur-
ther, the trade dress presented in a Web site may be in keeping with
the image of a particular business, but not reflect the exact trade dress
used in other advertising for the business. So, protection of the trade
dress contained in the Web site interface may not be easily gained if
secondary meaning is required. Next, consumer survey evidence can
be costly and inaccurate. It is hard to tell how many people are even
using the Internet much less how many people made associations to
a particular source after viewing a Web site. A small business or en-
trepreneur may not have the resources to gather the proof needed to
show that the Web site user interface acquired secondary meaning.
177. Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1979).
178. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Finally, showing intent in copying the design does not trigger a pre-
sumption of secondary meaning. It is not determinative, but merely
evidence. 7 9 Given the number of Web sites on the Internet, it may be
onerous to prove that a defendant had an actual intent to copy a
plaintiff's trade dress.
Due to the standards for proving distinctiveness and the fact that
Web sites are modified often, it is likely that only Web site interfaces
which are inherently distinctive would be protected under a trade
dress theory. For example, interfaces with an elaborate border or
motif that is consistently used throughout the site, even though the
site's information is changed and updated, would likely qualify for
trade dress protection. Another example is a Web site that contains
similar content to material that is already used as a motif on bro-
chures or in other marketing materials. It is unclear if all elements in
the visual screen would be protected as the total look and feel or trade
dress of the interface. It is possible that a court would filter out those
command elements that are widely used by other Web sites, like the
filtration analysis used under copyright law. A command key or
button would have to be very unique and not separable from the total
presentation of the visual screen display in order to be included in the
trade dress protection available for a Web site user interface's look
and feel. Of course, even if a plaintiff proves distinctiveness or sec-
ondary meaning, there are still problems with proving that the user
interface is nonfunctional.
c. Functionality
A design is "functional" ... if the design affords benefits in the
manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with
which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the
design's significance as an indication of source, that are important
to effective competition by others and that are not practically
available through the use of alternative designs 80
"Functionality" is a term of art in trademark law that does not
just mean a utilitarian use. As the court in In re Morton-Norwich
Products, Inc.""1 reasoned, "'functionality' is determined in light of
'utility,' which is determined in light of 'superiority of design,' and
179. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033,1041 (2d Cir.
1992).
180. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995).
181. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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rests upon the foundation 'essential to effective competition.' 18 2
Basically, merely using a design that adds efficiency to the look and
feel of a Web site user interface would not be enough to keep the de-
sign from being functional. There is a balance between the public
interest of using innovations and encouraging competition and the
need to provide an incentive for investments in innovations. Subject
matter will not be protected by trademark law, due to its functional-
ity, when "the public and private interest of avoiding consumer con-
fusion is outweighed by the anti-competitive consequences of trade-
mark protection." 8
Computer programs are arguably completely functional or utili-
tarian because they cause an operation to occur. Likewise, under
copyright law, the user interface on a Web site could be deemed a
purely functional aspect of the site because it provides a means for a
potential consumer to interact with the information or products for
sale. However, according to functionality in terms of trademark law,
a Web site could satisfy the nonfunctional requirement because it
does not just mean utilitarian. The rationale behind the doctrine of
functionality in a trademark sense can be described as "encouraging
competition by preventing advances in functional design from being
monopolized."'' 4 For example, the purely graphic visual screen
presentation part of the user interface, in particular, could be non-
functional because there are many competitive alternatives to what is
presented in the display. Having a monopoly on the overall arrange-
ment, i.e., trade dress, of the Web site user interface would not inter-
fere with competition because there would be so many other equally
efficient ways to arrange a site.
The design of a Web site user interface would be functional if
those benefits gained from the particular design could not be easily
duplicated by simply using of another design. For example, the ar-
rangement of the user interface might make it more user friendly, or
make it easier to navigate the product information. A competitor
would likely be able to duplicate or create this benefit of use simplic-
ity in a different manner, so there may not be a functionality preclu-
sion. Even so, when dealing with a commercial Web site, the most
prominent benefit gained would be the identification of a product's
source for marketing purposes. This source identification advantage
182. Id. at 1340 citing Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631,643 (2d Cir.
1979).
183. RESTATEMENT (HIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17(1995).
184. LeSportsac Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71,77 (2d Cir. 1985).
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from the arrangement or look and feel of one's Web site would
clearly be nonfunctional.
However, strong evidence that something is functional exists
when few comparable alternatives in the market place are available
or when the design is so superior that other alternatives may not
readily compete. This- is the main .problem when looking at the func-
tionality of a Web site user interface because the alternatives for ar-
ranging a Web site can be somewhat limited. It is hard to tell exactly
how many alternatives would be needed to satisfy a court. It is clear
that the main concern in granting trademark or trade dress protection
is that the protection should not hinder competition. Thus, so long as
there are ample options for creating the arrangement of a Web site
beyond the particular arrangement choice used by one owner, the
site's interface should not be considered functional. Also, as the In-
ternet grows, it is likely that numerous alternatives will be available
for creating or building a Web site. Finally, it is unlikely that the ar-
rangement or combination of a Web site user interface would be con-
sidered a superior design. While a particular Web site arrangement
may be creative or clever, such that it attracts consumers, this quality
will not be enough to make the site a so superior in design that com-
petition would severely suffer without public use of the design.
In light of the potential problems, does this competition ration-
ale for functionality allow protection of the visual screen display and
the layout presentation of the "buttons" that operate the Web site to-
gether as a whole? Fortunately for Web site interfaces, the likely an-
swer to this question is "yes." Copyright law's notion of functional-
ity could preclude specific elements of a Web site from gaining
protection.1 15 Unlike with copyright protection, the functionality of a
trade dress is determined by considering all the elements in a combi-
nation, rather than considering if each element is individually func-
tional.1 16 The protection sought by trade dress is based on the ar-
rangement or combination of elements as a whole. So, the
combination of the functional elements may be deemed nonfunc-
tional "if it serves to distinguish the product from rival products
185. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
186. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Birkham Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Whether the configuration of [an article] is functional or can receive trademark protection
depends on whether its design as a whole is superior to other designs, not whether its compo-
nent features viewed individually have a function.").
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rather than being necessary to the product's use. ' 187 It has been es-
tablished that "a particular arbitrary combination of functional fea-
tures, the combination of which is not itself functional, properly en-
joys [trade dress] protection." ' 8 So, the overall trade dress is not
functional just because there are some elements contained in the trade
dress that are arguably trademark functional; like the buttons for
navigating a Web site.
The concept behind trademark functionality makes trade dress
protection of all the elements comprised in a user interface more fea-
sible than copyright protection of all the elements. Unlike copyright
protection, the total look and feel, which includes the visual display
and command icons, has a better chance of being deemed nonfunc-
tional under trade dress.
D. Standardfor Infringement: Likelihood of Confusion
When determining the likelihood of confusion between a plain-
tiff's trade dress contained in a Web site interface and someone else's
Web site trade dress, a court will consider many factors. The Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition189 and case law provide
many factors to consider, but frequently the eight factors enumerated
in Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics'90 are applied. The
factors applied from the Polaroid case are: (1) the strength of the
mark (trade dress); (2) the similarity between the two marks (trade
dress); (3) proximity of products in the marketplace; (4) quality and
price of defendant's product; (5) bridging the gap; (6) actual confu-
sion; (7) defendant's good faith and intent; and (8) sophistication of
the buyers. 191
The strength of a trade dress will be evaluated by the distinct-
iveness of the trade dress and its potential to identify the source. As
discussed, it will be very feasible to prove a Web site interface is in-
herently distinctive. A court will consider how distinctive the trade
dress appears in the eyes of the purchasing public. However, if the
187. Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp 1398, 1407
(N.D. Cal. 1995). See also STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp 1551, 1558-59 (N.D. Cal
1988).
188. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991).
189. RESTATEMENT(riHn) OFUNFAIRCOMPETMON § 21(1995).
190. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). The Polaroid
factors are also discussed in McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc. McGregor-Doniger, Inc.
v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979).
191. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
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trade dress is registered, there will also be the advantage of presumed
validity, which means presumed distinctiveness. 19 2 Next, a court will
look at the content of the two Web site interfaces at issue to find
similarities in the whole arrangement. However, the similarity be-
tween two sites is just one factor considered for finding infringement,
unlike copyright law where the standard is only accounting for the
substantial similarity between the works. In addition, while actual
copying will be strong evidence of substantial similarity under copy-
right law, it is not required for trade dress infringement. 193
A court will look at several market factors affecting the products
to determine a likelihood of confusion. First, the proximity of the
products is considered, i.e., if products are in competition with each
other. If the goods are similar in nature and type, such that they
compete for consumers, there would likely be more confusion in a
consumer's mind about the source of the goods when the consumer
sees a similar looking Web site interface.' 94 Second, the market po-
sition of a defendant's product is taken into account by considering
such things as the price and quality of the products. 195 A defendant's
products that are less expensive and made from materials of poor or
lesser quality will not likely be confused with a plaintiffs products
that are very expensive and of high quality. For example, a site sell-
ing Dooney & Bourke purses, which are made from fine leather and
sold at high prices, will be less likely to be confused with a site sell-
ing inexpensive vinyl purses. Third, a court will take into account
the likelihood of the plaintiff naturally expanding into markets that
are similar to the defendant's selling markets, such that confusion
would occur, i.e., bridging the gap. 96 On the Internet, it will proba-
bly not be very helpful to look at the expansion into geographic mar-
kets because the Internet is essentially accessible worldwide. These
market factors may not all be relevant to a Web site interface, but de-
pending on the facts, a court will apply them.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994).
193. The standard is likelihood of confusion, not whether copying occurred. Furthermore,
the Restatement points out, "likelihood of confusion should not be inferred from proof that the
actor intentionally copied the other's designation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETrTION § 22(2) (1995).
194. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d at 496 (discussion of the situa-
tion when two products are in competition or in fields similar enough that a likelihood of con-
fusion could occur).
195. Id. at 497.
196. Id. at 497-499.
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Proof of actual confusion is strong evidence for showing a like-
lihood of confusion, but it is not required. 197 It may be difficult to
calculate this actual confusion on the Internet because it is so vast
and undefined, but it could be a relevant factor. Next, a court will
consider the defendant's intent regarding the infringement. 198 On the
Internet, there could be a good faith mistake by a defendant because
there are so many Web sites in cyberspace. A small business may
not realize they have created an infringing site, so a court will con-
sider this and possibly just require the defendant to modify its site.
Finally, a court will consider the sophistication of the buyers of
plaintiff's products. The more sophisticated and informed buyers
are, the less likely they are to be confused by a similar brand or prod-
uct on the Internet. For example, a doctor buying expensive, high
technology medical equipment will likely be very informed about the
products available and their sources, so the doctor's likelihood of
confusion with other medical equipment would be more remote.
However, on the Internet, there may be many buyers who will not be
sophisticated since the Internet is so widely accessible. Also, young
children who do not have a great deal of buying experiences to rely
upon are using the Internet. So, this factor may be very important for
determining confusion of consumers on the Internet, especially for
products that are marketed to young children.
For infringement, a court will weigh and consider these factors
in light of the facts presented in each case to determine if an ordinary,
prudent consumer would be confused as to the source. 199 This is not
an exhaustive list, but these factors will help a court evaluate the
likelihood of confusion about the source in a consumer's mind. The
goal is to prevent the unfair competitive practice of exploiting the
good will of a plaintiff's trade dress, which represents a plaintiff's
image and source in the marketplace.
Based on the combination of these above factors, proving a
likelihood on confusion may be easier than proving substantial simi-
larity under copyright. Under copyright law, a Web site interface
may only be eligible for "thin" protection because the protectable
197. "A likelihood of confusion may be inferred from proof of actual confusion."
RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) oF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) which allows recovery of profits or damages when repro-
duction of a mark is done "with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause
confusion .... ." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THID) oF UNFAm COMPEnTION § 22 (1995).
199. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc. 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979) citing
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. ILG. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44,47 (2d Cir. 1978).
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creativity is only in the arrangement of facts or public domain infor-
mation.20° In this case, copyright infringement would only be found
for exact copying of the arrangement or layout of a plaintiffs Web
site user interface. However, exact copying is not always the prob-
lem. Due to the analysis used for finding a likelihood of confusion,
trade dress would provide more complete protection for a wider
range of misuses of a Web site owner's creative user interface.
V. THE OPEING SCOPE OF TRADE DRESS PROTECTION
Trade dress protection is more difficult to calculate than protec-
tion of a trademark because there is not just one individual mark to
consider. Instead, an overall impression, concept, or arrangement of
elements is at issue. In the past, trade dress protection was not
broadly applied because it was difficult to define and many courts
were hesitant to grant such protection. Today, many courts seem to
be less skeptical, due to the recognition that consumer association
with motifs, sounds and colors exists. For instance, color alone can
be a protected trade dress under § 43(a),201 even when it is not inher-
ently distinctive.202
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Ca-
bana, Inc. 203 ("Taco Cabana") held that the protection of trade dress
should not be less than trademark protection because it complies with
the Lanham Act's purpose to "secure to the owner of the mark the
goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers. ' 2 4 It is also of note that the
type of subject matter deemed protectable in Taco Cabana seems to
indicate the Supreme Court's willingness to apply trade dress protec-
tion in a broad manner. If the "festive and vivid color scheme" 205 of
a Mexican restaurant can be a protectable trade dress, then surely the
creative look and feel of a Web site user interface can be afforded
protection when it is distinctive and nonfunctional.
Taco Cabana further widens the scope of trade dress protection
in another important way. Some courts required secondary meaning
in order for inherently distinctive marks to gain trade dress protection
200. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
202. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
203. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
204. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) quoting Park 'N Fly
v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
205. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992).
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under § 43(a)206 because the mark being protected was not eligible for
registration.207 But, this rationale has been discounted by the Su-
preme Court.2 8 We now know that a trade dress can be inherently
distinctive under § 43(a)20 9. The Court made it clear in Taco Cabana
that requiring secondary meaning would have anticompetitive effects
by disadvantaging new companies or a business entering a new sell-
ing market.210 This is especially helpful for protecting Web site inter-
faces because many new businesses are entering product markets all
the time, and they would clearly be disadvantaged by having to im-
mediately prove secondary meaning just to gain protection of their
trade dress on the Internet. If secondary meaning was required in or-
der to enforce the protection of a trade dress under § 43(a), then a
trade dress theory would likely not be feasible for protecting Web
site interfaces from being copied or "knocked off."21'
Since trade dress is becoming more widely used and clearly rec-
ognized by courts as legitimate legal protection equal to actual
trademarks protection, it is very probable that trade dress will be used
to protect the look and feel of Web site interfaces. Legal practitio-
ners of trademark law propose that trade dress protection is broad
enough to protect distinctive, nonfunctional Web site interfaces that
go beyond simple listings of information.2 2 Also, case law confirms
that the scope of what subject matter qualifies for trade dress protec-
tion is broadening. 23 If the trend continues, the look and feel of Web
site user interfaces will probably be added to the list of items pro-
tected under a trade dress theory.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
207. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 772 (1992) citing Vibrant Sales,
Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
208. Id. at 776.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1994).
210. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 775.
211. In marketing and fashion terms, a "knock off" is like a copy, but there may not be
exact copying of a design or pattern. The "knock off' product, for example, a dress, reminds
consumers of another similar dress that was released to the public before the "knock off."
This usually happens when couture fashion is "knocked off' by a designer that uses inexpen-
sive materials to make a garment similar to the couture garment.
212. Sally M. Abel & Marilyn Tiki Dare, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave
New Frontier, (Oct. 28, 1996) <http:lwww.fenwick.comlpub/smatrade2.html> (no longer ex-
ists at site, though an updated version exists. Copy of the original on file with Santa Clara
Computer & High Technology Law Journal office).
213. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 765.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Protecting a Web site interface as valuable intellectual property
will be difficult, but it is a necessary consequence of the growing
computer age. It is clear that all aspects of a Web site interface may
not be protected by copyright law because the theory of protection is
limited. User interfaces are arguably utilitarian and functional meth-
ods of operation, so they may be excluded from copyright protection
due to exceptions in the Copyright Act. Also, in light of the current
trend toward lower protection for non-literal elements in a computer
program, copyright may not completely protect the overall presenta-
tion of a Web site interface, in other words the look and feel of the
interface.
It is possible that trade dress will be a more successful means by
which to protect the overall design or look and feel of a Web site user
interface. Distinctiveness may be difficult to prove under a trade
dress theory, but consumers are increasingly demanding more ad-
vanced graphics and interactions on the Internet, so more complex
distinctive interfaces are being created all the time. Also, trademark
functionality is not utilitarian based, as in copyright law. So, a Web
site user interface may still gain protection even with some utilitarian
elements included in the layout. It is hard to predict how a court will
apply a trade dress theory to protecting Web site interfaces from be-
ing "knocked off" in cyberspace. However, the trade dress theory of
protecting the total scheme or layout that identifies and distinguishes
a specific source in the marketplace seems a fitting theory for pro-
tecting Web site user interfaces because they are so widely used for
distinguishing businesses and selling goods in cyberspace.
